Battle for Hungary: How the EU plans to defeat Viktor Orban

Three weeks out from the most consequential European election of the year, the EU has aimed every weapon in its arsenal at Hungary, as Brussels prepares for its best shot yet at taking out Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Orban’s animosity toward the EU establishment runs deep. For more than a decade, the Hungarian prime minister has often been the bloc’s sole dissident: railing against its open-door migration policies, embrace of LGBT ideology, and “suicidal” plan to welcome Ukraine into the union. Orban has secured carve-outs from the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions that enabled Hungary to continue purchasing Russian oil, and is currently vetoing a €90 billion loan package for Kiev.

The EU has responded by withholding funds equal to 3.5% of Hungary’s GDP over his banning of LGBT propaganda and refusal to accept non-European migrants. With the future of its Ukraine project now on the line, Brussels has pinned its hopes on Peter Magyar and his Tisza party, which promises to overturn Orban’s domestic reforms and Budapest’s opposition to the EU’s designs in Ukraine and beyond.

After the European Council failed to find a workaround to Orban’s veto at a March 19 meeting, the EU’s chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, hinted that work was underway on a “Plan B.” Based on the strategy playing out in Budapest, ‘Plan B’ clearly involves a full-scale campaign of censorship and subversion to influence Hungary’s upcoming elections.

Rapid Response

On March 16, European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier quietly announced that the EU had activated its Rapid Response System (RRS) to “combat potential Russian online disinformation campaigns” in the runup to the Hungarian election. The mechanism will be active until one week after the vote, Regnier said.

While most Europeans have never heard of this system, the RRS has been a key tool in the commission’s censorship arsenal for years. It empowers EU-approved “fact-checkers” to flag online content as “disinformation” and request their removal from platforms – Regnier cited TikTok and Meta as two examples.

Theoretically, platforms such as Meta and TikTok participate in the system voluntarily. All major social media companies have to sign up to the EU’s ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation’. However, a trove of documents published by the House Judiciary Committee in Washington this year revealed that these companies were threatened – often explicitly – with punishment under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) if they refused to tow the EU line.

The premise resembles a Mafia-style protection racket, with the deputy chief of the commission’s communications directorate telling platforms in 2024 that refusal to sign the codes of conduct “could be taken into account… when determining whether the provider is complying with the obligations laid down by the DSA.”

The DSA is now in force, giving Brussels’ fact-checkers the final say over what constitutes “disinformation” ahead of the election.

Peter Magyar’s allies in Meta

The argument that these fact-checkers favor Magyar is well founded. Over four European elections in which the Rapid Response System was activated, the Judiciary Committee found that fact-checkers “almost exclusively targeted” right-wing and populist candidates and organizations. “Moreover, the requirement that these fact-checkers be approved by the European Commission creates a clear structural incentive for the participants to censor Euroskeptic opinion and content,” the committee noted.

Hungarian MEP Dora David, a former Meta employee and member of Magyar’s Tisza party, boasted last year that “we’ve seen companies change their behavior” based on the threat of DSA enforcement, citing Meta’s removal of pro-Orban content as an example.

The fact-checkers can count on sympathetic staff within the social media companies. After several members of Orban’s Fidesz party claimed that Meta has already started restricting the reach of their Facebook posts, commentators Joey Mannarino and Philip Pilkington identified Oskar Braszczynski as the employee likely responsible. Braszczynski, who works as Meta’s ‘Government and Social Impact Partner for Central and Eastern Europe’, has shared pro-Ukraine, anti-Orban, and pro-LGBT content on his personal social media accounts.

”The European Commission is outsourcing the task of content moderation to so-called external civil society actors, all of whom have a progressive orientation,” Fidesz MEP Csaba Domotor said in Brussels on March 18. Regarding Braszczynski’s role in the censorship program, Zoltan Kovacs, a spokesman for Orban’s office, said that having “a highly politicized figure overseeing the region undermines platform neutrality and raises questions about potential interference in Hungary’s election.”

Strong-arming social media platforms

The links between Magyar’s party and Meta may streamline the EU’s censorship efforts, but Brussels is not above strong-arming platforms that refuse to play by its rules. This exact scenario played out in Romania in 2024, when Euroskeptic candidate Calin Georgescu won a shock first-round victory. Romanian and EU authorities immediately declared that Russia had interfered in the election and had run a coordinated campaign on TikTok to help Georgescu win, and the election was annulled.

The day after the annulment, TikTok wrote to the European Commission stating that it had found no evidence of a Russian-linked campaign in support of Georgescu, and that it had in fact been asked to censor pro-Georgescu content by authorities in Bucharest. This content included “disrespectful” posts that “insult the [ruling] PSD party.”

The commission pressed forward and demanded that TikTok make “changes” to its “processes, controls, and systems for the monitoring and detection of any systemic risks.” TikTok complied, and agreed to censor content implying that democratic processes had been undermined in Romania “for the next 60 days to mitigate the risk of harmful narratives.”

Ten days later, and despite its compliance, the European Commission opened formal proceedings against the platform for “a suspected breach of the Digital Services Act (DSA) in relation to TikTok’s obligation to properly assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity.”

How the EU outsources its smear campaigns

In Hungary and Romania – and in elections in France, Germany, and Moldova – the EU has used the threat of “Russian online disinformation campaigns” to justify its activation of the RRS. When no such threat exists, Brussels can outsource the job of manufacturing it.

Just over a week before Regnier announced the activation of the RSS, journalists at the Polish nonprofit Vsquare claimed to have uncovered evidence that Russian “election fixers” were working in Hungary to swing the election for Orban. In a tale reminiscent of an espionage thriller, the outlet claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin had dispatched “a team of political technologists” from Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, to Budapest, where working under diplomatic cover at the Russian Embassy, they are likely running “vote-buying networks, troll farms, and on-the-ground influence campaigns.”

The report cites “multiple European national security sources,” without disclosing any further details.

Almost all of Vsquare’s published work – which includes investigations tying Orban’s government to Russian intelligence, as well as hit pieces on populist leaders Robert Fico in Slovakia and Andrej Babis in the Czech Republic – is based on information provided by European intelligence agencies, and interviews with pro-EU politicians and NGOs.

The outlet is funded by grants from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an agency of the US State Department that helped foment the 2014 Maidan coup in Ukraine, sponsored meetings of anti-Beijing officials and delegates in Taiwan, and financed a UK-based organization working to drive right-wing American news outlets out of business. It is also financed by USAID, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and two EU-backed journalism funds.

Whatever the role these agencies played in concocting the story, it served the dual purpose of giving the EU an excuse to switch on its censorship machine, and giving Magyar political ammunition against Orban.

”Agents of Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, are stationed in Budapest under diplomatic cover to influence the elections,” he told supporters at a rally in the city of Pecs on March 8, before leading the crowd in chants of “Russians, go home!”

Is the EU’s election interference working?

Magyar currently holds a nine-point lead over Orban, according to an aggregate of polls compiled by Politico. However, the polling organizations showing the clearest advantage to Magyar are those affiliated with the opposition or funded by the EU: the 21 Research Center, which is financed by the European Commission, has Tisza leading Fidesz 49% to 37%; the IDEA Institute, which has accepted EU and NED money, shows Magyar’s party leading 48% to 38%; Median, which was founded by a member of the liberal SZDSZ party linked to the opposition HVG newspaper, shows Tisza beating Fidesz by 55% to 35%.

Despite the rosy polling, “many” EU leaders secretly believe that an Orban victory is “likely,” Politico has reported. Hungarian EU Affairs Minister Janos Boka told the outlet that he believes that by sponsoring one-sided polling, Magyar and his allies in Brussels are “building the narrative that if they lose the election, then this is an illegitimate result.”

The fact that the European Commission extended its RSS measures until one week after election day suggests that this might be the case, and that the EU may be preparing to fight a long and bloody battle to win its decade-long war on Orban and bring Hungary back under its control.